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Abstract    
 
Purpose: 
Corporate financial communications concern public and private disclosure (Holland, 2005). This 
paper explains how: banks developed financial communications; problems emerged in the GFC. It 
explores policy responses.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: 
Bank cases reveal construction and destruction of social, knowledge and economic world of  financial 
communications over two periods. 
 
Findings: 
In 1990s learning about financial communications by a 'dominant coalition' (Cyert, March, 1963) in 
bank top management was stimulated by gradual change. Management learnt how to accumulate 
social and cultural capital and developed 'habitus' for disclosure (Bourdieu, 1986). From 2000 rapid 
change and secrecy factors accelerated bank internalisation of SWM values; turning 'habitus' in 
'Market for information' (Barker, 1978) into a 'psychic prison' (Morgan,1986); creating riskier bank 
cultures (Schein, 2004) and constraining learning. 
 
'Masking' and rituals (Andon, Free, 2012) restricted bank disclosure, and weakened governance and 
market pressures on banks. These factors mediated bank failure and survival  in 2008, as 'psychic 
prisons' 'fell apart'. Bank and MFI agents experienced a 'cosmology episode' (Weick, 1988). Financial 
communications structures failed but were reconstructed by regulators. 
 
Research limitations/implications: 
The paper introduces sociological concepts to banking research and financial disclosures, to increase 
understanding; of financial information, bank culture; and how regulation can avoid crises. 
Limitations reflect the small number of banks, and range of qualitative data.  
 
Practical implications: 
Regulators will have to make visible: change processes; new contexts and knowledge; and 
connections to bank risk and performance; through improved regulator action and bank public 
disclosure. 
 
Originality/value: 
The paper shows how citizens require transparency and contested accountability to democratise 
finance capitalism. Otherwise problems will recur. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
This paper aims to explain how banks developed their financial communications and how problems 
emerged in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The focus is on bank learning about financial 
communications in the ‘market for information’ (MFI) (Barker, 1998; Holland, 2017). The research 
question concerns how did banks develop their financial communications function before the GFC and how 
did it perform during the crisis?  The paper explores bank success and failure in learning during 1990-2000, 
and 2000 to 2008 leading to and during the GFC.  The paper makes a contribution to an emerging stream of 
qualitative literature in finance and accounting concerning disclosure content (Holland, 2009), behaviour 
(Roberts et al, 2006; Marston, 2008), and function (Rao et al, 1999). The paper is set in the context of the 
‘market for information’ (MFI) (Barker, 1998; Holland, 2017) or the world of corporate executives, 
analysts, fund managers, auditors and other information users.  The paper reveals how structure and 
behaviour in corporate financial communications and in associated disclosure activity can develop through 
periods of change leading to success and failure. 
    The core research problem addressed concerns how development of bank financial communications has 
contributed to problems in: information production; in markets; and banks. Section 2 on research methods 
outlines sources of data and use of grounded theory methods to understand: bank learning for financial 
communications; and subsequent problems. The summaries to sections 3 and 4 discussed below provide 
brief insights or a ‘sneak peek into the investigated scene’ (p121, Locke, 2001). These constitute a short 
‘empirical narrative’ for the paper and a concise ‘theoretical narrative’.  These provide readers with a ‘map’ 
to navigate the paper (Golden-Biddle and Locke, (2007) in the next part of the introduction below.  They 
provide an early overview of the richness of the data, overall empirical patterns, and theoretical 
interpretation of how the case banks learnt and changed their disclosure activities over time. Section 5 
notes that connected change processes and resulting social and knowledge risks in financial 
communications contributed to financial risks in the world of finance and banks. Regulators will have to 
regulate and make visible the: connected change processes; and newly constructed structures, contexts and 
knowledge. Both regulators and banks will have to enhance disclosure to reflect conduct, behavior, actions, 
within changing contexts; all relative to perceived ‘good practice’ and acceptable ethical standards. If not, 
the same problems will recur.  Section 6 outlines the conclusions. 
       In terms of an empirical narrative, section 3 discusses how in the 1990s bank top management 
learning about financial communications by a ‘dominant coalition’ (Cyert and March, 1963) was 
stimulated by everyday experiences, environmental change, incentives, gradual shareholder wealth 
maximising pressures and financialisation processes. Learning concerned how to: organise and conduct 
bank disclosure (structure, behaviour and content); to stabilize external states within change; and to avoid 
negative consequences concerning power and reputation of bank top management; and wealth of investors. 
Learning involved the gradual internalisation of shareholder wealth maximising values in bank culture, 
hierarchy and teams, and behaviour. Section 4 investigates problems, negative incidents, successes and 
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failures in the bank learning process over time and shows gradual deterioration in social, culture, power, 
knowledge and economic structures related to bank financial communications eventually leading to failure.  
Top management in banks such as RBS and HBoS were unthinking and uncritical in their imitation and 
conformity when developing: internal financial communications functions; external MFI networks; and 
disclosure activities (Holland, 2017). They were more concerned about ‘keeping up appearances’ and 
concealing information when conducting financial communications and a period of increased 
financialisation (Haslam, 2010) and intensification of shareholder wealth maximising pressures. Other 
banks such as Lloyds, Barclays and HSBC faced similar pressures to conform but were more critical of the 
process.  These factors were central to bank failure and survival.     The empirical insights revealed the: 
fragility, significance; and function structures in the world of finance, and the need (for regulators and 
governments) to maintain their stability. 
       A theoretical structure and narrative is also developed in sections 3 and 4 to match empirical insights 
into bank management learning about bank financial communications in stock markets.  For example, 
concepts such as ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1986); ‘psychic prison’ (Morgan,1986); and Stones’s (2005)’strong 
structuration theory’;  are use to explore how: social structures and knowledge mediated the changing 
impact of shareholder wealth maximising and financialisation pressures; in two distinct periods of gradual 
and  rapid change before the GFC. Differences in bank social and knowledge factors also mediated bank 
failure and survival outcomes in 2008.  Concepts of organisational culture (Schein, 2004) and ‘masking’ 
and use of rituals (Andon and Free, 2012) are used to analyse bank conduct of communications pre crisis 
and during crisis. The theories are used to analyse the empirical findings and develop the ‘theoretical 
narrative’ and frame for interpretation (Golden-Biddle and Locke, (2007). Their use demonstrates the 
potential to develop a coherent and integrated theoretical frame closely matched to the empirical findings. 
This embryonic theory or literature frame illustrates the potential to connect: change processes; larger 
structures (social, economic) that banking and finance agents operate in; their knowledge of, and power in 
this system; their disclosure actions (or non actions) and behaviour in this world; as well as outcomes.   
The combination of empirical insights and appropriate theory is intended to enhance understanding, 
meaning, and the power of critical analysis for those involved in this field.  It is intended to enhance trust 
and confidence for readers concerning the judgements employed in interpreting the cases and in 
constructing the ’bank financial communications model’ and its problems.  The aim was not to develop or 
test these theory frameworks or develop meta theory, but to position the paper, its issues and empirical 
structure, relative to a wide range of relevant literature. The aim was demonstrate their collective power in 
interpreting the combined phenomena, in suggesting new areas and directions for research, and in 
contributing to further policy development. 
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2. Research methods   
The paper seeks to explain how banks developed their financial communications and how problems 
emerged in the GFC, through grounded theory field research and theoretical interpretation.  The focus is on 
bank success and failure in learning during 1990-2000, and 2000 to 2008 leading to and during the GFC. 
Two sources of data on banks are used in this paper. Firstly, historic field research in banks (and other 
companies) by the author during 1993 to 2001.  Secondly, new public source of data on banks, pre crisis 
and during the GFC, published in the period 2011 to 2015. 
    Historic field research in banks revealed many insights into the bank learning about their financial 
communications to stock market in the period from the 1990s to 2008 and beyond and the many problems 
they experienced.  The author had initially developed bank (and other company) case material for the 
1990s period to 2000. This was used to develop an embryonic grounded theory view (Locke, 2001) of 
bank (and other company) learning about financial communications from cases in 1993-94, 1995-1996, 
2000-2001. The grounded theory thus reflected bank (and other company) case experiences over this 
period.  The author’s historic case data for large UK banks for the 1990s was drawn from large UK banks 
such as Lloyds, BOS, RBS, HSBC, Barclays and others.  Given the confidential nature of the interviews 
these banks are not named and have been referred to as Banks A, B, C, D, E in section 3 when discussing 
change in the 1990s.  
    Significant new public sources were developed in 2011-2015 in the form of major books, and regulator 
reports such as FSA reports, Perman (2012), Turnbull (2013),Fraser (2014), Fallon (2015).  These were 
based on much new insider interview information during 2008-2012 with the main actors in banks such as 
RBS, HBOS, Lloyds, Barclays and HSBC. These provide new insights into the Northern bank failure and 
the UK bank problems in the GFC and afterwards.  Given these are public sources, RBS and HBOS are 
used as named banks to illustrate examples of bank failure, and Lloyds, Barclays and HSBC are used to 
show success. These sources on problems created novel means to further develop ideas on bank learning 
about financial communication for the 2000 to 2008 period.  Thus case and archival data cover the major 
large UK banks in both periods. The paper combines the author’s historic case data for large UK banks for 
the 1990s with the new UK bank sources in 2011-2015. Together they are used to create many new 
insights and a grounded theory of ‘bank financial communications and learning and associated problems’ 
was developed.  
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3. Learning about bank financial communications in the 1990s   
 
Section 3 discusses how in the 1990s learning: by a ‘dominant coalition’ (Cyert and March, 1963) in bank 
top management; about financial communications; was stimulated by everyday experiences, environmental 
change, incentives, and gradual shareholder wealth maximising pressures. Learning concerned how to: 
organise and conduct bank disclosure (structure, behaviour and content); to stabilize external states within 
change; and to avoid negative consequences concerning power and reputation of bank top management; in 
external MFI social networks and stock markets (Holland, 2017). Learning involved the gradual 
internalisation of shareholder wealth maximising values in bank culture, hierarchy and teams, transactions 
and behaviour.  Figure 1 illustrates the main elements of bank learning about internal and external worlds. 
The grounded theory in figure 1 provides a summary schematic view of behaviour in the case banks.  This 
is intended to aid reader understanding of complex phenomena captured by the grounded theory of ‘bank 
learning about financial communications’. The grounded theory is specific to the periods in which data 
was available.  In section 3 this includes the shareholder wealth maximising (SWM) period of stability pre 
crisis. In section 4 this includes further insights into the fragility of this behaviour and associated grounded 
theory during the crisis period and its aftermath. 
     Section 3.1 explores how the UK bank board and the top management teams were leading agents in 
‘learning organisations’ (Pedler, et al, 1997; Easterby-Smith  et al, 2000). They ‘looked in’ to develop bank 
organisational forms and processes to achieve their financial communications and disclosure aims 
concerning the ‘market for information’ (MFI) and stock market environment.   Section 3.2 discusses how 
management also ‘looked out’ and learnt about: Banking markets, financial transactions and competition. 
They learned about ‘Market for information’ (Barker, 1998) networks; and 1st and 2nd tiers or sub networks 
in the MFI ‘tailored’ to the (financial communication and influence) needs of specific banks (Holland, 2017).  
Section 3.2 also explores how bank top management learnt about:  negotiated power in these structures; and 
how to use power and take disclosure decisions in the structures; to produce desired outcomes in markets. 
This was how bank and MFI agents constructed understanding of their world as ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1986).   
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Fig 1 Bank learning about financial communications   -  Creating a - dynamic interactive- disclosure system 
 
        Internal structure and power in the Bank                      External structure and power in MFI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   3.1 Learning about internal bank organisation – ‘looking in’. 
 
Section 3.1 uses the case data to illustrate how UK bank board and the top management teams were 
‘learning organisations’ in the 1990s (Pedler, Burgoyne and Boydell, 1997).  Learning was led by a 
‘dominant coalition’ (Cyert and March, 1963) of actors such as the chairman, chief executive and finance 
director. They formed: a small elite and closed group; operating as an informal but powerful structure; 
which spanned the formal board and top management team structures. The ‘dominant coalition’ was 
concerned about, issues of power and values, as well as creating a financial communications organisation, 
in the bank. Their learning was stimulated by incentives, and external change pressures to develop 
financial communication capabilities. They ‘looked in’ and learnt to: internalise shareholder wealth 
maximising values; develop bank organisational forms; enhance capabilities of individuals and teams; and 
to maintain or increase their coalition power.  Learning actions occurred during everyday disclosure 
actions (learning ‘by doing’ and ‘by trial and error’); by imitation; and during periods of reflection and 
discussion (reflexivity) (Pedler et al, 1997). Learning occurred through knowledge transfer mechanisms 
such as: recruiting experienced managers; observing good practice and benchmarks; and using 
communication consultants.  
Section 3.2 –‘Look out’ – Bank learning about   
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A key starting point in the 1990s was that the case banks learnt how to structure and staff the 
financial communications function by drawing on: the existing ‘dominant coalition’; established and 
formal board and top management functions; and by setting up a specialist Investor Relations function.  
Bank D:  ‘In the past two years we have developed a new bank structure combining the Chief Executive, Finance Director, and 
Investors Relations staff and we have become much more active in investor relations. We have created new forms of regular 
contact between these bank executives and the institutions’. 
 
There were many case examples of banks responding to mimetic and coercive pressures operating within 
an external institutional perspective (Scott and Meyer, 1994;  Rao and Sivakumar ,1999). For example, the 
pressures arose for bank top management to learn to meet market benchmarks. 
Bank F: ‘There  is intense pressure on this thin blue line in our bank to meet institutions and brokers analysts … and to release 
more…information to them and…market. They benchmark us against… competition. Market pressure is increasing ..on …a  small 
management group and is taking up an enormous amount of our  time. We question this… but… have to fall in line’.   
 
 Case banks also learnt about the financial communications function by various knowledge transfer 
mechanisms such as: recruiting experienced managers; observing good practice and benchmarks; and 
using consultant advice.  Acquisition of experienced staff at board and top management level was one 
means to learn how develop this financial communications expertise and to improve internal links. New 
members of the Board, a new Chief executive and IR staff (or new ‘dominant coalition demanded by the 
MFI) were often a stimulus to the transfer of new ideas and to learning about the financial communications 
function.   Bank A also learnt about these issues through its mistakes during a bid process.  
‘we would have been a much more effective in our bid .….If we had bought in a finance director and investor relations staff with 
experience here… fund managers would have seen much more of the internal sources of value,….…poor quality of our 
communication about a fairly good management team and the good history of performance meant we lost out’ 
 
Bank management learnt that their skills and competence at strategy development and execution were vital 
to the quality of disclosure.  They also observed and copied bank disclosure methods in other banks 
through many mechanisms such as observing major bank problems and ‘tricks’ of winners. Bank A 
provides an example of learning from good practice by competitor Bank F during a bid. 
‘ Bank F emphasised contact with fund managers and gave much slicker ..  presentations than us. This was down to Chief 
Executive X and Chairman Y. …..they saw . the top twenty fund managers two or three times…were …more persistent in their 
contact. …X  in  particular,  was the  star turn with Y backing him up. This behaviour surprised the City because  Y  was  known 
to despise ..UK fund managers..during..presentations … he backed up X and was …supportive… Bank F  made up for a weakness 
in communication skills… by  recognising  Y’s limits … put him…as .. second  stringer  and  put  X  out front as the main person 
to implement the strategy and he appeared excellent in terms of  his  ability to talk about it.’ 
 
External consultants, played an important role in guiding this learning and encouraging internal and 
external exchange of expertise.  Consultant activity and their use of in-house rehearsals were central to the 
rate of learning relative to change, and to imitation and adoption of best disclosure practice. 
 
Bank D shows learning about inter-bank competition and setting benchmarks for other banks 
‘We ..set the trend …organising our top team to talk to .. City and …..Investor Relations presentations to  the  institutions…  
increased voluntary disclosure …  in .. report and ..private meetings.  But  .we've lost the benefits because .. banks  are ...all 
organised the same way…  doing the same things … talking the same language … the  institutions  cannot  distinguish between us 
….  However,  in terms  of..  core institutions, we..have their confidence …. we hope they'll help us when we need their help’ 
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Stones (2005) strong structuration theory can be used to provide a broad theoretical interpretation of the 
above learning by bank top management.  Learning (actions) occurred for top management individuals in 
external structures as boards, top management teams and ‘dominant coalitions.   They exploited internal 
structure in the form of general and specific knowledge about bank organisation. Learning actions and 
outcomes occurred: during routine financial communications and disclosure decision actions (learn by 
doing); and during periods of reflection by the ‘dominant coalition’ within external and internal structure.  
Top management faced strong external change pressures and had strong reputation, power and wealth 
incentives to learn and act in an informed way. Control over disclosure to financial markets was 
recognised as central to: financial communication effectiveness: power and wealth issues for individuals 
and teams; and was controlled by the ’dominant coalition’. 
3.2 Learning about external structure as the ‘market for information’ (MFI) in the 1990s  
 
During the 1990s, the bank ‘dominant coalition’ (Cyert and March, 1963) ‘looked out’ and learnt (Pedler et 
al, 1997) about the nature of: the ‘market for information’ networks and stock market links (Barker, 1998; 
Holland, 2017). They learnt how top management in large banks were socially and economically connected 
to large FMs in ‘elite social and economic clubs’ or ‘1st tiers’ or ‘status groups’ (Preda, 2005) in the MFI. 
Their operational staff were connected in ‘2nd tier’ groups. Bank agents learnt how to develop bank tailored 
sub-networks in 1st and 2nd ‘tiers’ in the MFI. They learnt how to maintain, increase and use power in 
networks. Learning actions occurred during: everyday disclosure actions (content and behaviour) in the MFI; 
imitation processes; and periods of reflection and discussion (reflexivity) by these agents (Pedler et al, 1997). 
Learning occurred by: observing accepted disclosure practice; and using consultant advice. Corporate 
communication consultants used rehearsals and ongoing interactions in the MFI to ‘push bank top 
management up the learning curve’ concerning information exchange structures and disclosure activity 
within them. Small investors and savers were ‘outsiders’ to the private world. They had little or no power 
and can be considered to be a ‘precariate’ (Savage, 2015) in the world of finance. 
     Bank top management experience of ‘looking out’ as a network ‘learning organisation’ (Pedler et al 1997) 
was distinguished by a very rich, high pressure, continuously ‘live’ 24 hour,  and competitive ‘information 
environment’ about the bank .  
 Bank E  ‘Learning by.. financial institution (shareholders) takes time … you have to reinforce it by regular meetings  …One  visit  
… is not  enough.   To..get some benefit …we require a track record of meetings over several years with…major shareholders.. 
….top analysts… They.. listen to our strategic plans in one year and..come back ..next year to compare and..see if..businesses are 
being managed as ..planned.  Shareholders .. insist on seeing top management when asking and discussing these questions’.    
 
Members of the bank ‘dominant coalition’ (Cyert and March, 1963) and senior executives in the MFI led 
learning in the MFI. They formed: a small elite and closed ‘1st tier’ group; as an informal but powerful 
structure; which spanned the top of the bank and MFI social structures. The 1st tier group included bank 
actors such as the chairman, chief executive and finance director and MFI actors such as large FM 
shareholders, and influential analysts (Holland, 2017). The elite 1st tier group were concerned about: issues 
of power (sources, hierarchy of, balance, uses, outcomes); diffusing shareholder wealth maximising values; 
9 
 
and creating network structures for exchange of information and influence between the bank and external 
MFI agents (Holland, 2005).  
Bank top management, often with consultants, learnt how to develop their own specific sub-
networks within larger elite networks. The 1st tier consisted of links to agents in the largest and most 
influential fund manager firms (say top 30) each holding more than 1% of the bank’s stock. In case bank 
D these consisted of 5 hedge FMs, 5 very active short term FMs, and 20 active long term FMs. The 1st tier 
links also consisted of close contact with journalists in the highest quality financial media such as in the 
FT, WSJ, and BBC, as well as links to top rated bank analysts (eg top 5).  
 
Bank D ‘We rationalised investor relations .. when our chief executive arrived.  Before it was ad hoc…if someone rang ..we saw 
them.  ……We have created.. regular contact between bank executives and..institutions. This includes priority contact between 
our top management and .. 5 to 10 proactive institutions every 6 months…rest…top 30 active financial institutions every year 
….. This is lot of change in a short time, but our consultants are …bringing us up to speed with our competitors’ 
 
A 2nd tier network was made up of smaller FMs, less powerful analysts and other MFI agents, who dealt with 
less senior bank staff such as Investors Relations and Finance Director. The 2nd tier group was much less 
powerful and threatening and hence much less resources (of executive time, reputation and skill) were used 
when disclosing information to the 2nd tier.  
Bank D:  ‘Our investor relation staff maintain contact with …our top 30 to 50 financial institutions and.. less influential analysts’ 
The above reveals how bank top management developed their understanding of how they were situated in 
a web or network of situated roles or ‘position practices’ (Stones, 2005) with other agents in the MFI.  
The bank ‘dominant coalition’ learnt how to tailor 1st and 2nd tiers or sub-networks in the MFI to the 
(financial communication and influence) needs of their banks. They learnt how to use the 1st and 2nd tiers 
in the MFI to achieve desired (bank, personal) market, wealth and power outcomes.  The variation and 
fluidity of the bank financial communications agents in 1st and 2nd tier MFI networks corresponds to 
Roberto’s (2003) proposed “stable core and dynamic periphery model” of strategic decision making in the 
‘dominant coalition’. The internal organisation of a bank ‘dominant coalition’, and its role as a ‘boundary 
spanning’ organisation structure (Rao and Sivakumar, 1999) tailored to MFI tiers, provided some form of 
stability for the bank and for MFI participants in a world of considerable uncertainty.  
A key dimension to learning about bank financial communications within MFI structures 
concerned the development and use of power. Bank and other elite agents were aware that the function of 
power was to create the means for 1st tier elite agents (and 2nd tier agents) to   exercise some control over: 
what is information in networks; how it is defined; what information is produced, disclosed and 
exchanged in the MFI; who gets information; and hence who has control over wealth.   As a result, the 
bank ‘dominant coalition’ sought to understand: external sources of  their power and threats to this; and 
the hierarchy of power in external structures. They discovered  how to use bank power  to: counter 
balance external power; take disclosure decisions (content and behaviour) to produce desired outcomes in 
markets (MFI ‘tiers’ and stock market);  and manage the fragility of  these outcomes. 
A key stimulus to learning by bank top management involved potentially threatening sources of power. 
  Bank D ‘We have learnt to look carefully at ..share register ..who our key financial institutions are.  Who is buying, who is selling, 
who's over and under weight.  We have learnt to distinguish the passive, active, pro-active and hedge managers and what their 
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different investing motives might be…. We're  now  more  realistic  why we go to see the institutions  and  why  they  buy  our 
shares.   ……We have learnt to recognise where power affecting us is concentrated in the market and where it is changing’.  
 
     Power conditions in elite or 1st tier group in ‘normal’ conditions (Holland, 2002) involved a ‘balance 
of power’ rather than dominance by any group. Bank E shows how it learnt about power structures and 
the balance of power in 1st tier with active FMs.  
‘If.. we  make a mistake on strategy or …change ..strategy ..this can.. radically alter …view of .. fund managers and 
...change their stakeholding …. This ….shows…influence …fund managers have over us ……..but they are not managing us. We 
are telling them what we intend to do and they … make a decision ..whether it is acceptable. If it is…. they hold a stake in us but 
..expect us to keep those promises …..This is not .. management interference … They are leaving us with our right to manage’ 
 
This learning about the impact of real business actions and information market actions revealed 
bank management needs to react to the coercive power of market participants in the (structured) MFI 
institutional setting (Roberts et al, 2006).        Learning also concerned outcomes.  Bank management 
sought an enhanced understanding of the impact of their financial communications on  tailored ‘tiers’  and 
the wider MFI (Holland, 2005). They sought to understand how bank actions via intermediaries: could 
influence ultimate stock market states such as bank stock prices, liquidity, confidence states; and  how 
these could  impact on bank cost of capital.  From a bank top management perspective: positive reactions 
from shareholders and desirable stock price outcomes to disclosure actions (content and behaviour); 
created positive links between executive pay and bonuses based on stock price performance. Bank F 
learnt how relatively stable intermediate outcomes could contribute to stock market outcomes. 
‘ If  you talk to..core financial institutions and communicate.. well, .. this  increases stability.. share price.  Institutions are the stable 
component in ..share price … we.. keep talking…make sure  they learn....are.. well-informed  and .. ensure.. stability.   
Bank F shows they also learnt about the fragility of expected outcomes in City and global finance networks 
and the limits of bank power. 
‘Our  aim  in  investors  relations is to… reduce volatility  and.. keep.. institutions  advised.   If  there is  a thing called loyalty, 
then we would like to have … it…. loyalty can vanish if the price is right.. the past two  weeks …our peripheral …institutions 
have put the Bank into play for ..takeover.. … You have to… watch…core .. and peripheral institutions… ..analysts, the  press  
and  the  more  frothy  institutions.. is  where most  of  the  volatility  lies  in  our share price and we…seek to minimise the 
effect.  We spend a  lot of  time  trying  to get them to learn about us…to keep them well informed and ..try to minimise their 
volatility.‘   
 
  
11 
 
4.  Bank learning post 2000 - Success, failure.     
 
    Section 4 investigates problems, negative incidents, successes and failures in the bank learning process 
over time. It shows gradual deterioration in social, knowledge and economic structures related to bank 
financial communications eventually leading to failure. During 2000 to 2006,  control by the bank 
‘dominant coalition’ over  bank financial communication functions, and their close connections with MFI 
agents and structures, combined with many change factors  to impair bank financial communications. 
Factors such as: rapid change and increased financialisation (Haslam, 2010); increasing bank complexity; 
and increasing role of intangibles in bank models (Chen et al, 2014); increased the power of ‘dominant 
coalitions’ to accelerate the internalisation of shareholder wealth maximising values in the rest of banks.  
The same factors played a role in the shared ‘habitus’ becoming a ‘psychic prison’ (Morgan, 1986).  Both  
shareholder wealth maximising internalisation and the ‘psychic prison’ encouraged higher risk taking bank 
cultures in bank (Schein, 2004). These factors and rapid change led to major failures in learning occurred 
concerning bank models, risk and communications. 
       Section 4.1 explores the development of the MFI psychic prison in 2000-06 and how this created 
problems such as higher risk taking bank cultures. In section 4.2 RBS and Lloyds cases are used to 
illustrate differing impact of internalised  shareholder wealth maximising values and the ‘psychic prison’ 
on these banks especially on their culture, with customers, and in disclosure conduct and content. RBS 
created a high risk culture and adopted highly risky conduct and action with customers and in markets.  
Lloyds sought to maintain their conservative bank culture and conduct and to counter the external 
pressures but increasingly faced problems when doing so.  Section 4.3 uses the RBS and CEO Goodwin 
case to illustrate how executive hubris combined with the ‘psychic prison’ to create a ‘toxic’ bank culture 
prepared to take extreme financial risks and at the same time conceal them through deceptive disclosure 
(content, conduct) in the MFI. Section 4.4 shows how, as the crisis emerged in September 2008 many 
connected elements failed together. These included: bank business models; ‘dominant coalitions’; MFI 
‘tiers; and agent knowledge of these (as a complacent ‘habitus’ set in a ‘psychic prison’). Regulators and 
governments immediately stepped in to support bank models, stabilise bank finances; and reconstruct bank 
and MFI financial communication structures and processes.    
4.1 Developing the ‘psychic prison’ during 2000 to 2006  
        Morgan (1986) argued that a ‘psychic prison’ can arise in inward looking and closed social 
networks.   Blake (1790) referred to this as ‘mind-forged manacles’ when referring to the poor of London. 
In this case they refer to ‘mind-forged golden handcuffs’ of the powerful and rich elite of financial centres 
such as London.  
         Various change, complexity and attention factors and the private nature of bank disclosure in the 
MFI all played a role in creating a ‘psychic prison’ (Morgan, 1986). They created an illusion of stability 
in the world of banking and of financial communications between bank ‘dominant coalitions’ and MFI 
agents such as large shareholders. They created an illusory world of stable social structure, knowledge 
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and power conditions which at the same time accepted ideas of rapid bank growth and risk taking. The 
taken for granted world of: bank and MFI social structure, knowledge and power conditions; began to 
deteriorate from 2000 onwards; despite appearing stable to the majority of participants.   
      More specifically, this occurred within (eventually failing) banking firms such as HBoS when the 
‘dominant coalition’ in board and top management teams had little prior experience of banking and bank 
problems. They had general management and financial communications experience but not banking. This 
formed ‘knowledge faultlines’ (Crawford, LePine, 2013) between the: ‘dominant coalition’; the rest of 
the board and top management teams; and operational line managers.  The ‘dominant coalition’ ignored 
important changes to their business models (Holland, 2010) and thought that high quality disclosure based 
on a narrative about growth and value alone (and not bank risk)  was adequate for their needs and those of 
MFI agents.  They learnt about: established MFI rituals: conventional information agendas; and 
disclosure conduct and content; and showed a preference for form in these matters over substance on risk. 
Their views dominated organisational learning in the board and top management team and set the ‘tone 
from the top’ for learning by middle managers, and front and back office staff. Similar problems also 
occurred between other MFI agents such as bank analysts and FMs and in financial media such as the FT 
and Economist. Before the crisis these connected actors used a common framing or interpretive scheme 
(Weick 1995) based on established ideas and information agendas about banks and markets (Holland, 
2010). These actors were caught up in the ‘spirit of the times’ concerning growth and increasing value. 
This altered their framing and led to them to ignore or downplay new risks.   
       The ‘psychic prison’ thus concerned shared private structures, rituals, knowledge, stable power 
relations, as well as shared narrative, earnings information agenda, behaviour, and values. This comprised 
shared but increasingly illusory narratives and knowledge how: bank business models worked: and 
banking markets and stock markets worked. It included bank top team structures closely linked to tailored 
1st and 2nd tier MFI networks, and elite bank and MFI agents operating with expectations of continued 
growth, exercise of power and success. It contained shared expectations about the primacy of established 
disclosure behaviour, protocols and rituals in behaviour and interactions.  It included shared assumptions 
about the importance of shareholder wealth maximising aims. 
       In the period 2000 to 2006 the shared ‘psychic prison’ constrained modes of thinking and trapped 
bank top management, analysts and investors in webs and myths of their own creation. They focussed 
their learning and decision actions within established social and power structures (bank organisation, and 
MFI network); knowledge of these structures and of the stock market; existing disclosure rituals of 
financial communication; and of conventional information agendas; as outlined in section 3. They were 
‘captured’ by the dynamics and intense pressures in everyday bank and MFI interactions and were 
constrained in their thinking and learning by these factors of established structure, knowledge, ritual and 
information agendas. In addition, time pressures and incentives (economic, power) meant they did not pay 
attention to the changing risks in bank business models (Holland, 2010; Chen et al 2014).  
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         During this period the world of stable and functioning social structure, knowledge and power 
conditions for the bank ‘dominant coalition’ and MFI agents described in section 3 began to deteriorate. 
As a result bank top management (both ‘dominant coalition’ and others) in banks such as RBS and HBoS 
were unthinking and uncritical in their imitation and conformity when developing internal financial 
communications functions and external MFI networks. They were more concerned about ‘keeping up 
appearances’ in disclosure activity. Other banks such as Lloyds, Barclays and HSBC were facing similar 
pressures to conform but were more critical of the process.  
A spectacular example of the problems this created arose before the banking crisis when bank top 
management and other MFI agents demonstrated their failure to understand new bank business models 
(Holland, 2010; Chen et al 2014). In the pre crisis period (2000 to 2006)  bank sell side analysts,  fund 
managers and the financial media, found it difficult to explore and learn about bank business models 
when meeting with bank top management and receiving private information (Chen et al 2014). This was 
true of all case banks such as RBS, HBoS, Lloyds, Barclays and HSBC as they faced rapid change in 
banking markets. Despite this lack of understanding both FMs and bank analysts demanded ever higher 
returns from banks and widespread adoption of the profitable business models. High exposure to financial 
risk had been accepted by these MFI agents, and by regulators and financial markets within (the 
assumptions of) a shared intellectual climate based on established knowledge (Turner, 2009; King, 2014).  
In this orthodox finance theory frame, risk was assumed to be diversified away across markets and 
residual risk efficiently priced. Major problems of disclosure content emerged. Bank top management (in 
banks that eventually failed such as RBS and HBoS) were not prepared (or able) to discuss the radical 
changes in their business models. Banks that succeeded were not able to explain why their business 
models were not as profitable as other banks. Fund managers and their buy side analysts showed little 
interest in the risk issues (Holland, 2010, Chen et al 2014) as they exploited rapidly growing earnings and 
security prices for banks and other financial firms.  
    Bank top management: and other elite MFI agents (operating in other large financial firms, regulators, 
and ‘quality’ media); used ‘established knowledge’ (expert knowledge and theory of finance) in a 
conservative and dogmatic fashion in controlled social structures (MFI networks, bank firms); to create a 
false impression of ‘correct’ knowledge use (Turner, 2009; King, 2014) and appropriate bank disclosure.  
This was an effective way for elite insiders: to influence levels of  trust, confidence and meaning 
structures amongst the public, other investors and politicians; to maintain their legitimacy in ‘a battle 
against others’ (Coad et al, 2015. P155); and muffle the views of ‘outsider’ sceptics predicting problems 
with banks heavily involved with US mortgages and associated securities..  
         However, they also created major risk exposures in banks and banking markets that could not be 
‘managed’ through principles based on expert knowledge and finance theory. They created a situation: 
where much of the upside benefits would accrue to them; and where downside losses would be 
experienced by quasi insiders and outsiders. The quasi insiders included small banks such as Northern 
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Rock, and the outsiders were the investing and saving public. The latter eventually paid for these 
problems through their direct losses and their taxes being used to support failing banks.  
       The combination of low awareness of issues, and high economic incentives noted above  was similar 
to behaviour in non bank  firms in the MFI noted in the ‘dot.com’ boom (Palepu et al 2008; Holland, 
2002) and the Enron case (Healy and Palepu, 2003). These conditions limited bank top management and 
other MFI agents search for explanations of emerging problems and hence much reduced the quality of 
bank disclosure. Northern Rock’s failure in September 2007, Lehman’s failure in September 2008, the 
problems with RBS and HBOS in 2008, and the subsequent GFC, reflected these problems 
4.2 The emergence of major problems in banks and the MFI   - before the crisis 
 
 Cases from RBS and Lloyds are used to illustrate the differing impact of rapid change, internalised 
shareholder wealth maximising values and the ‘psychic prison’ on these banks especially on their culture 
(Schein, 2004) and bank disclosure conduct and content (Andon and Free, 2012). From the mid 1990s, UK 
banks such as RBS and HBoS created a high risk culture and adopted highly risky conduct and action with 
customers and in markets.  Other banks such as Lloyds, HSBC and Barclays sought to maintain their 
conservative bank culture and conduct to counter the external pressures. They increasingly faced problems 
when doing so.  The rapid internalisation of shareholder wealth maximising (SWM) values and shift in 
bank culture was particularly evident in RBS and HBOS, where: the ‘dominant coalition’ of Chairman, 
Chief Executive and Finance Director, empowered by market support; were in a position to demand active 
pursuit of  aims by the rest of the board, top management, and operational management. They sought to 
match bank culture to market culture and its demands. Skills in areas such as general management, M&A, 
and customer selling were seen as ‘SWM friendly’ and prioritized over banking skills and experience. The 
same bank management teams had strong beliefs in their own capabilities relative to traditional bankers 
and MFI agents (See Fraser 2014 for RBS; and FSA report on HBOS, 2012).  In Schein’s (2002) terms 
bank culture in RBS and HBOS was changed and controlled by a ‘dominant coalition’ who had learnt how 
to do the bidding of the MFI and stock market. In G30 terms (G30, 2015, p17) they controlled and changed 
culture as ‘ the mechanism that delivers the values and behaviors that shape conduct’  
      SWM internalisation and shift in bank culture was more gradual in Lloyds (Fallon, 2015), and in 
HSBC and Barclays. It was moderated by internal factors such as: the dominant coalition being less 
powerful; and operating within a strong conservative banking culture. The latter was defended by many in 
the bank and was resistant to wholesale change driven by stock market values. The proponents of this 
culture maintained: a high concern about risk management; and the perceived importance of banking skills 
and banking experience at the top of the bank. 
      RBS and Lloyds provide examples of the differing impacts of the ‘psychic prison’ in the MFI and of 
bank cultures on bank conduct of communications and disclosure content.  The insightful ideas of Andon 
and Free (2012),  Boin et al (2009, and ‘t Hart (1993),  are used here for the analysis of differing bank 
conduct in their pre crisis and crisis disclosure activity.  In both RBS and HBOS cases the bank ‘dominant 
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coalition’ learnt how (in differing ways) to adapt their communications strategies of ‘masking’ (or 
concealing of information) and the use of rituals (Andon and Free, 2012) during their disclosure activity 
within ‘psychic prison’ conditions. Section 3 has shown how banks learnt how the formal and informal 
disclosure activities took place within well established bank top management and MFI financial 
communications structures. The disclosure rituals they faced were symbolic behaviour that was socially 
standardised and repetitive (‘t Hart, 1993) in bank teams and with MFI individuals and teams.  In both 
RBS and Lloyds cases disclosure rituals and disclosure content ‘masking’ were used to persuade MFI 1st 
and 2nd tier agents to accept the bank’s interpretative frame, and to use this ‘core’ group (Holland, 2005) to 
influence the collective sense-making process in the wider MFI. Differences in: strategic decisions; top 
management skills; beliefs and aims; created different forms of vulnerability in business models, and 
financial communications structure for RBS compared to Lloyds. They encouraged differences in: 
management exercise of power (internal and external); disclosure conduct (behaviour); and content. The 
’psychic prison’ conditions’ in the MFI led to: acceptance of RBS and CEO Goodwin’s behaviour; and to 
‘due diligence light’ by RBS shareholders and other MFI agents concerning Goodwin. In contrast Daniels 
as CEO at Lloyds faced intense scrutiny over why he and Lloyds were not imitating RBS’s risky growth 
strategy 
      The two mini cases for RBS and Lloyds have been constructed from financial media sources, from 
regulatory reports, and from major new books on banks in the period 2011- 2015. The RBS case shows 
major problems in: business models (Holland, 2010); bank management and financial communications; in 
2005-06 before the GFC. The FSA report (2011) on RBS, Fraser (2014), and the financial media (2007-
2015) were the sources for this mini case. The Lloyds case shows conservative banking policies, gradual 
learning and success in bank management and financial communication matters. Fallon (2015), and the 
financial media 2007-2015 were the sources for this mini case. Each bank had special factors at work in 
their failure and success.  Both cases reveal emerging problems in the social, knowledge and economic 
structures in banks and the MFI, especially the intense financialisation and SWM pressures and the 
development of illusions in the ‘psychic prison’.  They reveal differences in how bank culture was both 
changing and acting as a moderating influence on change. Both reflect ‘upper echelons theory’ 
(Hambrick, 2007) whereby ‘executives’ experiences, values, and personalities greatly influence their 
interpretations of the situations they face and, in turn, affect their choices’. 
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RBS case: 
Throughout the 1990s RBS had rapidly internalized SWM values. This contributed to a swift change in bank 
culture to a higher risk and return driven model in their combined commercial and investment banking 
activities. General management and selling skills were prioritized over banking skills and experience.   
This change in financial aims, culture and preferred management capabilities was driven by chief executive 
George Mathewson (an engineer with private equity experience) from 1992 onwards. From 1998 he was 
supported by deputy CEO Fred Goodwin (an accountant with experience of providing services to 
banks). This strongly focussed shareholder oriented approach was developed by chief executive Fred 
Goodwin and Chairman George Mathewson from 2001 (Brinded, 2011; Fraser, 2014).  The bank was very 
successful in this period especially in its takeover of NatWest and had a track record of major increases in 
profits and stock price from 1992 to 2004. This reinforced top management beliefs in their own capabilities 
relative to other bankers and MFI agents.  Goodwin’s success in M&A further stimulated SWM 
internalisation and intensified the shift in bank culture to higher risk taking at all levels. 
    However, by 2005, RBS and Fred Goodwin faced major reputational issues in the MFI and stock market 
(Fraser, 2014 Ch 21).  Goodwin as chief executive was accused of arrogance and aloofness towards 
shareholders, analysts and the wider City. The bank board and top management team were seen as out of 
touch with the City and dominated by Goodwin. Tom McKillop (a pharmaceutical specialist) took over as 
chairman of RBS from 2006 until 2008. As chairman he supported many of Goodwin’s decisions and 
continued to promote the new bank culture. 
    The core information agenda disclosed to the MFI and stock market was about excess M&A deal making 
activity led by Goodwin. This was perceived to have diluted earnings and reduced bank stock price relative 
to competition.  A ‘Goodwin’ discount was perceived to be in the share price, as the bank appeared to pursue 
size over shareholder value. Some countervailing views existed in the MFI which still valued the cost cutting 
skills of Goodwin with new acquisitions. Goodwin and the bank appeared to learn from this criticism. 
Attempts were made by RBS in 2006 to improve financial communications with the MFI, to focus the 
information agenda more on organic growth, and argue in public at least that deal making would stop. There 
was some scepticism amongst MFI agents that this apparent change in the information ‘game’ was tactical 
and Goodwin was still a ‘deal junkie’.  
      The risk and value information agenda between the bank and MFI continued to focus on conventional 
issues (profits, EPS, growth etc and SWM impact) and ritualised interactions through road shows and 1:1s. 
Very little emphasis was placed on risk and threats to value from new investment banking activities.  The 
emphasis was on increasing profits, whilst risk management declined as a priority. 
       Despite these problems RBS learning continued to focus on understanding and changing RBS financial 
communication structures and disclosure content to match existing City rituals and expectations about forms 
of information and achieving SWM aims. Learning about financial communications content was about how 
to persuade markets agents to accept RBS’s growth strategy. It was also about how to conceal strategic 
decisions especially M&A before they were executed, and how to persuade market agents that the 
subsequent M&A decision was a ‘good idea’. Thus like other top management functions in RBS, financial 
communications was driven by Goodwin’s hubris and dominance. This was the focus of learning and change 
and not the new and risky forms of financial intermediation being developed in RBS (Holland, 2010).                             
      
This case reveals how RBS learnt to adapt its communications strategies, both in disclosure conduct and 
content, in the immediate pre crisis period. The literature can be helpful at this point in exploring this 
behaviour in the RBS case or field based story (Locke, 2001, p121-122). In terms of Andon and Free’s 
(2012) and Boin et al’s (2009) conceptual frame, they make use of ‘masking’ and rituals.  Masking involved: 
promoting an image of ‘business as usual’ through sustained business and profits growth; downplaying 
M&A risks; and obfuscation about future M&A deals and the changing nature of RBS business model and 
banking markets.  The use of rituals (of reassurance, and solidarity) arose internally within formal board and 
top management team structures and processes. They arose externally in regular 1:1 meeting with 
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shareholders and other actors in established MFI 1st and 2nd tier structures. In this frame of analysis, members 
of the bank ‘dominant coalition’ learnt how to use rituals and masking to persuade other bank top 
management, board members and external MFI actors to accept a certain interpretative frame, of crucial 
importance in a collective sense-making process. In this immediate pre crisis period the select group of RBS 
top management (‘dominant coalition’) sought to shape the collective MFI interpretations of the dynamic 
and fast changing situation they were in. They sought to use disclosure (conduct and content) to shape 
external MFI sense making:  to ensure external agents accepted what the RBS ‘dominant coalition’ thought 
were acceptable risks; to  demonstrate management control over the risks;  and to minimize the perception of 
threats amongst their insider and private ‘public’ of 1st and 2nd tier MFI agents.  This disclosure activity was 
strengthened by many shared (bank and MFI agent) contextual factors such as: SWM values; MFI structures; 
and by the existing ‘psychic prison’ conditions in the MFI. Thus in RBS case, it is argued a shared frame 
was generated in the pre-crisis situation (Boin et al.,2009). 
Lloyds Bank Case  
In contrast Lloyds bank, with Eric Daniels as chief executive faced problems in financial communications 
concerning its conservative banking model, a reputation for risk avoidance, and for stable but relatively 
lower returns than competitors.  In the 1990s, it had gradually internalised SWM values and changed to a 
slightly more risky banking model in a gradual manner relative to its core retail and commercial banking 
activities. However, the board and top management team with strong banking experience had sought to 
maintain a conservative banking culture whereby risk was managed first and this became the means to create 
profits and shareholder value. From 2005 to early 2007 Lloyds bank top management and board faced 
constant pressure: during financial communications and interactions with shareholders and other MFI actors; 
to adopt a much more risky strategy in pursuit of higher returns (Fallon, 2015, Chapter 13). This pressure 
came from many external sources including: from the network of MFI agents such as bank analysts and bank 
shareholders (FMs); competitors; deal makers and activists; and from some of their own staff.  In particular 
US investment banks pressured commercial bank lenders such as Lloyds to lower lending standards and 
produce securities they could sell on at profit.  
          Daniels had much prior commercial banking experience,  prior experience of  financial crises in Latin 
America earlier in his career at Citigroup, and had learnt much  in banking markets over thirty years. This led 
him to question a strategy of bundling of US sub-prime mortgages into very risky asset based securities 
(ABS) and using rating agencies to provide ‘high quality’ rating based on very little transaction data. He 
privately questioned the role of commercial banks in originating mortgage loans (sub-prime), holding some 
ABSs, and using large Wall Street investment banks to sell and distribute the rest of the highly rated ABSs to 
investors worldwide. Bank profits were soaring based on replacing their ‘originate to hold’ model with this 
‘originate to distribute’ model. Fallon (2015, p152) noted that in Daniels view key members of the 
community of  top bankers ‘….didn’t properly understand risk and believed that by spreading it around the 
system in the form of re-packaged  collateralised debt they were actually de-risking the system. In his 
opinion the opposite was true’. He learnt how little the community of top bankers knew of these risks and 
factors that could cause failure.  He identified lack of banking experience amongst his UK competitors as a 
major factor. For example, he attended a major banking conference in early 2007. He saw (again) how little 
this community of top bankers (or community of practice, Lave and Wenger, 1991) knew of the prevailing 
risks and factors in their banking models. Over time he had learnt how much they were ‘locked in’ to a 
‘comfort zone’ (or shared ‘habitus’ as an illusionary ‘psychic prison’) concerning bank strategies. This 
confirmed his prior experience and learning and the need to stick to a ‘contrarian strategic message’ about 
his bank’s conservative commercial banking model.  
    He decided that when a crash came (modest or otherwise) his task was to position Lloyds to take 
advantage of this. Issues of competitive advantage and waiting for opportunities for Lloyds were factors 
here. He was backed by the chairman Victor Blank, and the rest of the bank board and top management, 
and their belief in a conservative but profit making bank culture. Lloyds ignored the intense external 
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pressures, continued to stay clear of sub-prime derivatives and new financial instruments, and stuck to a 
conservative commercial banking model. Victor Blank as chairman supported this decision.  
Daniels, Blank and Lloyds financial communication specialists did not discuss in public the risks 
they thought their competitors faced. This topic was perceived as a very price sensitive matter for banks 
and markets and it also formed an important competitive advantage for Lloyds. They did not expect a 
major crisis but did expect problems for rivals that would create opportunities for the bank.   
 
This case reveals how Lloyds learnt about financial communications. The literature can be helpful 
at this point in exploring this behaviour in the Lloyds field based story (Locke, 2001, p121-122). Daniels 
and Blank and their financial communication specialists shared the same ‘financial communications 
habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977) with other bank top management and MFI agents such as large fund managers 
(often as shareholders in several banks such as RBS). They used the established private rituals (Boin et 
al, 2009) and conventional information agendas in the MFI to persist in communicating this ‘contrarian’ 
message about the bank to markets but faced resistance from large shareholders. They continued to 
actively engage with the external network of bank analysts, FM shareholders in banks, bank rating 
agencies, and other MFI and ‘City’ actors, to promote this conservative banking model and its benefits. 
Daniels and Blank learnt how unpopular they were with these external agents, but persisted in their 
message. Given the bank’s steady performance, the agents learnt that Lloyds was a ‘dull, dull, income 
stock’ (Fallon,(2015, p153) and if they wanted higher returns they should invest in the riskier assets 
chosen by competition such as RBS and HBOS. Ironically, it was this success that meant the UK 
government encouraged Lloyds to buy HBOS in 2008 and inherit its profound problems, leading Lloyds 
into part government ownership.  
    This case reveals Lloyds ‘dominant coalition’ was also learning (in the immediate pre crisis period) 
how to adapt their disclosure communications strategies of masking and the use of rituals (Andon and 
Free, 2012).Masking of disclosure content involved: creating a business as usual image based on a known 
and conservative business model; downplaying benefits of risks taken by other banks; and obfuscation 
about Lloyds slow movement towards a riskier business model.  Conduct of financial communications 
was heavily influenced by disclosure rituals. The use of rituals (of reassurance, and solidarity) arose 
within: formal board and top management team meetings;  and in regular 1:1 meetings with shareholders 
and other actors in established MFI tier structures. The Lloyds ‘dominant coalition’ operated within a 
more supportive and less intimidated board and top management structures than RBS. However Lloyds 
top management faced a more hostile MFI world and ‘psychic prison’ than RBS. Thus in the Lloyds case, 
it is argued that contesting frames were generated in the pre-crisis situation (Boin et al, 2009). 
Despite this Lloyds sought: to shape the collective MFI interpretations of the dynamic and fast changing 
situations they were in; to maintain a conservative banking model; and to wait for strategic opportunities.   
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4.3 The ‘height of hubris’ combining with the MFI ‘psychic prison’.  
 
        Extreme versions of  disclosure ‘masking’ and misuse of rituals (Andon and Free, 2012) in bank 
culture and the ‘psychic prison’: were evident in the conduct of RBS’s financial communications (led by 
Fred Goodwin as a one man ‘dominant coalition’); in the period from March 2007 to the start of the GFC 
in October 2008; and RBS’s subsequent collapse. At the time executive hubris in Goodwin was not 
recognised. His conduct was broadly interpreted by MFI agents, such as shareholders more as high 
executive confidence, competence and control over bank related events. These conditions led to 
acceptance of: Goodwin’s behaviour; his use of ‘due diligence-light’ for the April 2007 ABN AMRO bid; 
and to high shareholder support for the bid despite turbulent conditions. The ‘psychic prison’ conditions 
in the MFI also led to the use of an equivalent form of ‘due diligence light’ by RBS shareholders and 
other MFI agents. Arguably these joint bank and MFI conditions contributed to bank deceits or omissions 
and commissions in the rights issue prospectus of April 2008 related to the ‘successful’ bid (Fraser, 2014, 
2016).   
      Fraser (p237, 2014) noted that there were serious problems of financial communications behaviour 
and disclosure content in RBS during this time.  Whilst Goodwin was actively pursuing acquisition (of 
ABN AMRO) he insisted he was unaware of any deals at the time. ‘I can’t think there is anything out there 
at the moment that seems desirable, doable or affordable’ (RBS results presentation March 1st 2007, in 
Fraser, 2014, p237). Goodwin had to be careful about price sensitive information about a specific target 
but given RBS’s  problems with a ‘Goodwin discount’ in the share price he was required to inform the 
market that he was now again actively searching for acquisitions.  At the same meeting he said ‘we don’t 
do subprime’ despite being aware of emerging problem in the US arm of RBS (Fraser, 2014, p246). 
At an Edinburgh press conference on 25th April 2007 Fred Goodwin and Santander and Fortis bank 
executives announced their joint bid for ABN AMRO. Goodwin said that ‘I think that due diligence-light 
would be what we’d be really wanting to do’ (Fraser, 2014, p243). At RBS’s August 10th shareholder 
meeting 94.5per cent of shareholders backed the deal as the board and top management presented a very 
positive case.  Despite the Northern Rock failure on the13th September, and a freeze in the interbank 
market, RBS won the battle for ABN AMRO by October 5th 2007. However, from April to June 2008 RBS 
raised £12bn in a rights issue to boost its capital reserves to deal with problems emerging from the £49bn 
purchase of ABN AMRO bank. By October 2008, the UK government bailed out RBS and its shares 
plummeted.  This precipitated a hostile FSA report in December 2011 and subsequent investigation into 
potential criminal acts by RBS board and management.  
    Fred Goodwin was informed on May 12th 2016 by the Crown Office (Scotland, UK) that the 
‘insufficient evidence’ meant that it was not going to pursue criminal charges against him or other senior 
managers in connection with the sale of RBS shares in the months before its collapse. Shareholders who 
experienced major losses and operated as the ‘Combined claimants group’ continued their legal action on 
these matters. Fraser (2016) immediately after the Crown office announcement argued that  
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‘…the ‘Combined claimants groups’ who are suing RBS for about £4 billion over this rights issue have looked and had access to 
9.5 million documents and some of the documents have only just been made available by the bank under duress….there was a 
whole series of deceits and deceptions which came into being in the aftermath of that disastrous acquisition (ABN AMRO)…   If 
one wants to know   a lot of the things that were going on inside the bank, some of which are being revealed I think in these 9.5 
million documents, there is …evidence to suggest that things like .......fraudulent trading    … conspiracy to defraud…. false 
accounting …. and a number of offences under the Companies Act 2006.. …. were committed by senior RBS executives… in the 
period from about December 2007 through to … their ultimate collapse in October 2008…’    And  ‘There were a number of 
omissions and commissions in the rights issue prospectus of April 2008  which suggest that the board   …was deliberately 
seeking to pull the wool over investors eyes… and the board of RBS led by Fred Goodwin and Tom McKillop  were arguably 
trying …to get  that money under false pretences…’ 
 
It will not be possible to know the full truth of the above disclosure content and conduct by RBS until the 
shareholders case against RBS is decided.  In December 2016, RBS agreed to pay out £800 million to 
77% of the claimants without admitting liability (Herald, Dec 6, 2016). In June 2017, RBS paid out £200 
million to settle a group litigation case by small shareholders (Dunkley,2017).    
 
4.4 Crisis and instability in Bank and MFI ‘information’ structures 
            
       The 2007-08 crisis in banking and finance sectors provides many insights into the instability of 
structures such as: bank top management teams; bank financial communication functions;  MFI 1st and 2nd 
tier networks; and associated knowledge and power conditions. In Stones’s (2005) terms: external 
structures as social organisation and power conditions in  banks, banking markets, and MFI; and internal 
structure as bank and MFI agent knowledge and ‘habitus’;  all collapsed as failing bank top management  
lost all understanding and ‘froze’ in the face of the crisis, sparked by Lehman’s failure on  September 16th 
2008.  Successful bank top management experienced the same phenomenon but their banks models 
remained resilient. 
      Management of failing UK banks such as RBS and HBOS experienced a ‘cosmology episode’ 
(Weick, 1988, Holland, 2010) where ‘things fell apart’ in terms of their banks liquidity position, share 
price and credibility of communications. They fell into the arms of government and regulators and had to 
relinquish all control over their strategy, asset and financing decisions, and financial communications 
(disclosure content and conduct) to these new powerful agents. Previously successful banks and their 
management such as Lloyds were also pushed into the arms of government and regulators and lost a 
considerable degree of control over their banking decisions, disclosure decisions, and influence over their 
stock price. 
       A special group of government and regulator based elite agents entered the vacuum and took control 
of failing banks, banking markets and MFI functions during the GFC. When banks or banking markets 
failed, these elite agents became especially important to: provision of funds; and the exercise of power in 
failing banks and failing banking markets. They became especially important to financial 
communications. During the GFC the specialist part of MFI dealing with banks: such as 1st and 2nd tier 
networks of FMs, bank analysts, bank rating agencies and financial media; faced massive uncertainty, and 
had little power. They played peripheral roles in creating information about banks: as they awaited 
decisions by regulators, politicians; and their instructions to bank top management. As a result security 
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markets experienced major losses and high volatility in banking and associated stocks (in most of the 
economy). Normal MFI activities were slowed as new temporary means for bank disclosure (content and 
conduct) to financial markets were established.  
            Government power and financial resources became central as the power of bank top management 
waned, and they relied on their ‘too big to fail status’.  Secrecy about both failing and previously 
successful banks was enforced by the powerful elite agents as they sought ‘behind scenes’ solutions to 
bank and banking market problems.  They formally disclosed and informally leaked information about 
solutions to stock markets, media, and public on selective basis to frame their sense-making, 
interpretations, avoid panics and to ‘jolt’ markets and failing banks back into life. Fallon (2015) described 
this behaviour during Northern Rock failure and GFC. In the Northern Rock case there was division, 
confusion and ignorance amongst regulators and politicians. 
       By the time of the GFC in September 2008 they had learnt lessons. They had learnt that banks 
required: more equity capital; and bank top management with knowledge of new bank models.  They had 
learnt to disclose information about these factors once they were in place. They had learnt to keep tight 
control over: bank related financial communications; their inner circle of regulators, treasury officials, 
politicians, and bank top management; and over information flows and economic actions. In the GFC the 
UK government plan was to ‘reassure markets with a decisive, clear and completed intervention in one 
stroke’ (p298, Fallon, 2015) by providing liquidity and directly or indirectly boosting bank capital to all 
major UK banks, failing and successful.  
     ‘Spin doctors’ from politics also entered the bank financial communications process and pursued 
political as much as economic aims. They ‘leaked’ to the media, creating momentum to stories and forced 
bankers to accept government plans. The MFI was not moribund as the Tripartite of Bank of England, 
FSA, and UK Treasury began to exploits its capabilities. For example, elite parts of the media especially 
Robert Peston  (from BBC) penetrated this ‘wall of secrecy’. He did this in the Northern Rock and GFC 
cases, at times causing the authorities much grief. As one of the government advisers noted during the 
GFC ’We’d say ‘Robert, what are you hearing’ and we all shared information. But my goodness, those 
leaks were damaging’ (p330, Fallon, 2015).   
    The above reveals bank regulator crisis communications strategies of: masking of disclosure content; 
and the use of rituals in disclosure conduct or behaviour (Andon and Free, 2012). Masking by the Tri-
partite (Bank of England, FSA, Treasury) and UK government included: recreating a ‘business as usual’ 
and bank soundness image by recapitalising banks, providing liquidity in banking markets, guaranteeing 
retail deposits, and emphasising the soundness of the bulk of bank loan portfolios. They sought to create a 
climate of being in control, and sought to boost confidence in banking markets and MFI that a solution 
had been found. These parties sought to downplay the extent of the crisis and present it as a problem 
restricted to a few large banks.  Obfuscation was tried but failed due to the extensive leaks from a 
combined political and MFI system. Rituals of reassurance were employed by the Tripartite recreating 
and using established private MFI channels for communication. Rituals of purification involved removing 
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all board members and top management in failing banks. Rituals of solidarity included the Tri-partite and 
government publicly backing management in non failing banks.  Regulators sought to define what the 
crisis was about by reshaping the collective interpretations of the dynamic and fast changing crisis 
situations, to  demonstrate government and regulator control, and to lower the fear and panic amongst 
insider and private ‘public’ of 1st and 2nd tier MFI agents, as well as the wider public of ‘outsiders’  
   The above ‘crisis handling devices’ (framing, ritualization and masking) reflects ‘tHart’s (1993) 
comment that ‘attention is drawn to the opportunity spaces that crises entail for policy makers and other 
crisis actors. To exploit these, it is important for decision elites to influence collective definitions of the 
(crisis) situation in such a way as to highlight preferred courses of action and to selectively obscure 
alternative interpretation’ 
       The empirical insights and theoretical analysis revealed the fragility of: bank organisation and MFI 
structures; of power conditions; and bank knowledge; in the finance based economic system. They 
highlighted how fragility was based in part on the perceived quality of disclosure content and conduct 
concerning bank business models and risk management. At the same time the analysis highlighted the 
continued significance and function of such structures in the world of finance, and the need (for regulators 
and governments) to recreate stable financial communications structure with high quality disclosure 
content, accepted disclosure rituals and conduct, and stable financing arrangements, as a way out of the 
connected problems in banks, banking markets and the MFI. It showed their need to handle the crisis 
using effective frames, rituals, and masking devices (‘tHart’s, 1993).  The ‘information game’ in the MFI 
was as important to them as the ‘refinancing, and risk management game’ in banking markets. 
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5.  How regulators can develop policy.   
                
     Sections 3 and 4 have illustrated how connected change processes in the world of information, banking 
and finance created conditions which contributed to the GFC.  At present regulators are focused on 
regulating individual conduct and behaviour within formal governance structures and market structures. 
They have shown considerable interest in structural matters such as bank governance (Cheffins, 2015); 
public disclosure of financial risks; and the public disclosure of private information exchanged in MFI 
structures (UK PSI rules, US FD2000). They have shown some interest in regulating contextual matters such 
as bank culture (G30 2016; and FCA in 2015). They have used insights in the pre GFC change process as 
part of their historical analysis of what went wrong. However, they have shown little interest in regulating or 
influencing the change process per se. Given the insights developed in this paper, it is clear that this rather 
limited, and fragmented conventional approach will not work. 
     The implications of:  the GFC; cases such as  RBS, Lloyds; and the theory frame adopted in this paper;  
is that regulators will have to make visible: connected change processes; new contexts; and knowledge. 
Systematic bank disclosure of information about: context and change has to be established; and matched to 
improved bank disclosure about economic activities, performance and risk. Regulators will have to ensure 
visibility and disclosure for: agent conduct; within changing contexts; all relative to perceived ‘good 
practice’. Citizens require much more transparent and contested accountability structures where they have 
the information and power to control the agenda.  This involves new moves to democratize finance 
capitalism by gaining access to a reformed MFI. If not, the same problems will recur. 
5.1 Regulating the change process  
 
      The paper argues there must be coherent oversight and regulator influence over change processes. 
Regulators have to influence connected change processes such as: ‘financialisation’ process (Haslam, 2010); 
learning; internalising SWM values; creation of the ‘psychic prison’; and their impact on: on agent contexts 
such as (bank and MFI) structure, culture and knowledge.  Regulators have to find ways to prevent negative 
conditions such ‘psychic prisons’ emerging in the world of bank executives and MFI agents. This paper 
proposes two ways in which regulators can understand, influence and, in part, manage the change process. 
       Firstly, they can use authors such as Bourdieu (1990) and Stones (2005) to analyse agent learning in the 
change process and how it is reflected in the mutual reciprocal interactions between: structure, culture, 
knowledge, power, SWM values, actions and outcomes.  Regulators could use these theoretical sources to 
analyse and publicly disclose how the change process and interactions play a central role in creating new 
contexts of structure, culture and knowledge, and how they in turn stimulate problems of bank culture, pay 
and behaviour of staff in banking. These complex interactions, associated change pressures, and new 
contexts, continue to be a primary source of bank misconduct.  
       Secondly, literature on ‘organisational learning’ could be used by regulators to monitor and influence 
the change process. This paper has provided many insights into successful and unsuccessful bank learning 
in the change process. Pedler et al, (1997 discuss empirical findings and theoretical analysis of learning in 
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many large organisations. These could be the combined basis for: ‘good practice’ guidance by regulators 
for: bank learning; and bank disclosure on learning. Harris (2002), Antonacopoulou, (2006), Chivers, 
(2011), Royal et al (2012) provide further guidance for monitoring bank learning.  
       In addition regulators must address how learning and the construction of bank and MFI structures can 
be modified by constrained SWM aims such as Porter and Kramer’s (2011) idea of ‘shared value’ or the 
‘Group of 300’ (2017) (of worldwide investors) view that social responsibilities have to be included in 
investment decisions.  This would involve regulation to modify SWM aims relative to codes of ethical 
behaviour and corporate social responsibility. It would require regulation to modify the conduct of bank 
and MFI agents relative to new aims, and require bank disclosure on adoption of aims.   
 
5.2 Regulating contexts 
    The paper argues that regulators will have to make explicit the nature of new contexts created by learning. 
They will have to find ways to make visible new bank and MFI structures, and make explicit new knowledge 
about this world.  For example, regulators must strengthen formal corporate governance mechanisms in 
banks relative to the informal bank and MFI structures and exercise of power discussed in this paper.  
Regulators must exercise some control over existing contexts such as the: culture and ethos of financial firms 
in networks and markets; and their impact on how bank and MFI agents transact and behave. Regulators 
must ensure that banks disclose more insights into: the bank knowledge base; ethical standards; and 
prevailing ideology and economic incentives; in these firms, networks and markets.  
Regulators should focus on structure and knowledge 
Formal governance mechanisms at board and top management levels  in both successful and failing banks 
satisfied ‘best practice’ during 2000 to 2008. Problems lay elsewhere with rapid change, elite groups, and 
the creation of dysfunctional informal social structures which undermined formal structures. This paper 
argues that bank private financial communication structures controlled by: dominant coalitions; MFI 1st 
tiers; must be reformed, disclosed, and governed by formal mechanisms. Regulators will have to: limit 
and disclose membership of ‘dominant coalitions’; and constrain the power of excessively powerful 
executives. The power of agents in external networks over banks will have to be formally recognised and 
the exercise of their power monitored. Regulators must ensure that banks (and other companies) publicly 
disclose: their list of top shareholders; and analysts; in 1st and 2nd MFI tiers. They must identify the 
restricted list of board and top management members who are allowed to talk to MFI agents. Timely 
information, can keep the rest of the board and top management team informed, and all external 
shareholders, and hence control a privileged group of bank executives operating as a hidden ‘dominant 
coalition’.   Regulators must play a role in publicly discussing and ensuring bank disclosure about 
strategies. They must be involved in publicly appraising bank strategies (collective, not specific) to 
prevent the creation of ‘psychic prisons’ in banks and the MFI.  
     Bank regulators must also insist that banker insider knowledge of: bank business models; risk 
management; financial intermediation processes; and role of financial and intangible resources; are robust 
in a range of circumstances (Holland, 2010).  Stress testing of: the financial parameters of models; and 
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management risk management choices; have been implemented by bank regulators (Bank of England, 
2016). However, bank boards and top management must also be regularly assessed and ‘stress tested’ to 
see if they: understand and believe in their models; have taken actions to ensure their models remain 
stable and robust; and their risk management skills remain relevant.  Such tests of bank management 
capabilities and attitudes must be publicly disclosed.  This could be the basis for a ‘master’s ticket’ or 
licence to operate as ‘captain of the bank ship’. 
Regulators should focus on bank culture and how it changes 
At present, regulators such as the FCA, BSB, and G30 seek to influence and change existing bank culture, 
and current behaviour in ongoing transactions. They do so in the interests of: fair dealing with customers 
and clients; and effective functioning of markets. They seek to change culture with respect to ideas of 
perceived ‘good practice’, such as embedding desired values and ethics, and adopting effective incentive 
schemes and ‘whistle blowing’ methods. These are derived from studies of many banking firms (G30 
study, 2015). The focus is on bank top (senior) management, middle management and front and back 
offices, and their incentives, behaviour and actions. The G30, BSB and FCA approaches may prove 
beneficial but desired changes in banking culture will always be limited if regulators ignore the external 
context discussed in this paper. As long as current conditions prevail there will always be a tendency for 
bank culture to become risky and amoral and intensify financial risks.   
      This paper proposes two ways in which regulators can understand, and influence bank culture.  In the 
first case, the G30  report into bank culture (G30, 2015 , p17),  defines culture as ‘ the mechanism that 
delivers the values and behaviors that shape conduct and contribute to creating trust in banks and a positive 
reputation for banks among key stakeholders, both internal and external’. This is a somewhat static idea of 
culture relative to empirical insights developed in section 4.  In Schein’s terms organisational culture is ‘a 
pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members 
as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems’.  Schein’s (2004, p17) definition of 
organisational culture is used in this paper because it includes ideas of learning and adaption.  Regulators 
could demand that banks use the above as a basis to publicly disclose  how they understand their culture. 
    In the second case the empirical evidence in sections 3 and 4 revealed how bank management chose 
many dimensions to culture such as:  preserving or ignoring historic bank culture; choosing the balance of 
SWM versus ethical values; matching risk taking to remuneration; and choosing the rate and degree of 
culture change. 
      If bank management can choose these many dimensions to culture, then regulators can also provide 
general advice and guidance and promote disclosure on these matters.  Regulators can demand that bank 
management choose culture change strategies that do not create conditions of ‘betting the bank’. Banks 
must publicly disclose how they understand the link between culture and risk. Bank regulators such as the 
FCA, BSB and G30 could:  make public common and desirable themes in bank culture; how this could be 
disclosed by a bank. The G30 report (2015) is a very useful first attempt in this regard.  Regulators such as 
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the FCA and the BSB could monitor: bank specific factors creating unique variants of bank culture; and 
how this differs from the common and desirable themes in bank culture. Information intermediaries such 
as bank rating agencies could monitor public and private information on culture as part of their rating 
activities. This monitoring could be done to ensure that: an extreme risk taking culture does not emerge; 
change pressures are being held in check; or used for customer innovation rather than benefit of elites.  
However, ‘rewriting culture’ is a challenge to the power of elites in the private and hidden world of 
finance and banking.  They will not give up their power based on their capitals (culture, social, financial as 
in Bourdieu (1986)) without a vigorous fight back ‘behind the scenes’ in which they will seek to ‘capture’ 
regulators.  The removal of the new chairman of the FCA, Martin Wheatley in 2015, and FCA decision in 
December 2015 to abandon a review of bank culture,  does not bode well for the above proposed changes. 
 
5.3 Regulating disclosure conduct and content  
 
 New regulation primarily focuses on changing existing conduct by bank agents. For example, UK changes 
such as the ‘Senior Managers Regime’ holds bank top management accountable for misconduct. New joint 
regulation in July 2015 by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) regulation on responsibility of bank management was a positive move in this direction.  
     Regulators have also begun to exploit the technology used in financial communications to change 
individual conduct and behaviour.  The Northern Rock failure, Lehmans failure, the problems at RBS and 
HBoS problems, and GFC have challenged the ‘silent unsaid agreement’ amongst elites and empowered 
the wider public and regulators in new ways. Problems in banks before and during the GFC (‘Levin-
Coburn’ Report, 2011), have encouraged regulators to make public: private MFI agent communications as 
emails; social media exchanges between say bank analysts; and private discussions amongst bank 
regulators (Bank of England (2015). Technology and political pressure have become means to make 
conduct in social networks more visible.   This could be the basis for the regulator to monitor all 
communications in the MFI between banks and other agents, and to use ‘intelligent software’ to probe 
private textual exchanges and phone conversations for emerging problems.  Disclosures and prosecutions 
of problematic cases could act a stimulant to good behaviour 
      Finally, we can note that regulators have been focussing on the banks and banking markets and have 
ignored the interactions with the MFI, stock market and the change process. These are the primary source 
of SWM pressures and bank culture changes. Regulators must also adopt a similar analysis and design 
conduct codes for key actors here such as large fund managers. As the Banking Standards Board noted 
(BSB, 2016) 
  ‘if we want to see a change in culture and standards of behaviour right across the sector, individual institutions, 
owners, investors and the people leading and managing them, all need to step up to the plate’ 
 
Regulation is also required about disclosure content.  Conventional bank disclosure, about tangible 
financial resources such as bank financial assets, liabilities, cash and equity and their risks, is essential. 
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However, given the role of negative knowledge and social network factors in the GFC, bank disclosure 
about performance and risk has to include the role of intangible resources as well as financial resources. 
Risk and return arises from both resources and ignoring the role of intangibles (such as bank top 
management knowledge) in creating financial risks reveals a fatal flaw in conventional bank disclosure. 
The focus must be on the bank and bankers ‘juggling’ the financial and intangible resources and their 
risks, as well as the more conventional focus on the financial resources being ‘juggled’. Top management 
must disclose information on formal and informal means to control risk. Formal controls include: levels 
of responsibility and autonomy; incentives and sanctions; control limits; numerical measures of risk; and 
risk reporting mechanisms, all overseen by top management. Informal controls involve using intangible 
factors such a culture and philosophy to control risk. Top management must be tested on their knowledge 
of all risk controls. The IIRC model (2013) for integrated reporting could act as a template for this 
comprehensive disclosure. 
 
5.4 Citizens, contested structures and democratizing finance capitalism 
        This paper argues that citizens as ‘outsiders’ will need much more than a conventional reform agenda. 
Increasing the quality of public disclosure on matters of change, context and conduct is essential to 
increasing citizen power.   However, given the tendency of this ‘insider system’ to absorb and control such 
regulatory changes and eventually defeat them en route to another failure, other approaches are required.  
Citizens must gain access to a reformed MFI where all current disclosure and accountability mechanisms 
are seized from ‘insider world’ dominance and placed into the public domain and where citizens have 
substantial power to hold banks and others to account.  Accountability mechanisms such as the: Regulator 
(say FCA in UK); Central bank (say Bank of England); Parliamentary committees; Board meetings; and 
bank report presentation meetings with fund managers and analysts; will all have to develop into more 
open and publicly contested structures. Citizens will need ‘outsiders’ as ethical leaders (say in the media, 
academics, lobby groups, MPs) – to do much of this work to provide them with their ‘outsider line of 
defence’.  They will need formal structures and events to mobilise these ‘critical’ agents on their behalf to 
criticise the system and its agents in open public debates – in open accountability mechanism where 
insiders are present – and where they are forced to defend their positions.   
      Reform of the MFI and disclosure systems could include ’outsider’ or citizen group attendance at 
annual report presentations for banks where time was specifically allocated to consider risk and other 
issues.  They could include a new and specialised ‘bank risk’ parliamentary committee where MPs pose 
questions to bank management  in open public meetings,  using questions derived from prior soundings 
with citizens and external ethical leaders. The FCA could also set up annual public meetings to probe 
related issues. A prior survey of citizens’ views, problems and questions, would be helpful here, thus 
replicating MFI insider practices. Citizens will need higher transparency, open accountability means and 
‘ethical’ leaders to help them overcome the social and knowledge forces that elites use to rule operational 
agents and to ignore citizens.  Citizens need such resources and powers to create and control the social and 
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economic structures in banking and finance and to drive economic processes in citizens’ interests.  This 
implies that finance capitalism should be democratised in some way.  Or as Shelley put it post Peterloo, in 
The Masque of Anarchy, 1832, Citizens should; 
Rise, like lions after slumber 
In unvanquishable number! 
Shake your chains to earth like dew 
Which in sleep had fallen on you: 
Ye are many—they are few 
 
The above agenda is quite a task for regulators but an overarching regulatory strategy connecting change 
processes, new contexts and new forms of conduct is required. The paper has provided an alternative way 
of thinking critically in an integrated way about policy change concerning the change process, new 
context formation, disclosure conduct and content. The intention is that this plays a role in creating 
an open and public conversation about these concerns and this in turn contributes to avoidance of 
repetition of the same problems. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The paper provides novel insight into bank change processes and top management learning about financial 
communications as disclosure content and conduct in financial markets. It illustrates: many problems of 
change and of learning; and develops an embryonic conceptual framework to analyse the problems. 
Empirical and theoretical insights suggest new ways of conducting research, and for increasing public 
control over banks, bank learning and financial communications. The conceptual framework was the basis 
for a critical analysis of how banks developed or did not develop their financial communications to 
respond to changes. The elite character of this change and its power and legitimacy implications were 
critically appraised.  
      The paper demonstrates how social and economic theory can be jointly applied in areas of change of 
banking, corporate disclosure and finance. This offers an effective way of researching and understanding 
this phenomenon. The insights emphasise the need for academics involved in: empirical research and 
theory development in the fields of finance, accounting and disclosure; to reflect a combined social, 
knowledge and economic perspective in their activities. For example, as suggested by Locke, (2001) 
literature such as Bourdieu (1990) on ‘habitus’ and Boin et al (2009) on ‘masking’ and rituals, have been 
used to interpret the bank case field based  narratives about financial communications. The dominance of 
one disciplinary perspective, cannot address the phenomena in an effective way.  
     The paper reveals how connected change processes and resulting social and knowledge risks can 
contribute to financial risks in the world of finance and banks. Regulators will have to regulate and ensure 
full disclosure of connected change processes; and make visible newly constructed structures, contexts and 
knowledge. Disclosure will have to be done for conduct, behavior, actions, within changing contexts; all 
relative to perceived ‘good practice’. If not, the same problems will recur. 
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     These solutions also require power over these matters and information to be shared with wider civil 
society and not just controlled by private, hidden elites. Questions arose in the paper concerning the 
privileged learning position and control by senior bankers over a privileged financial communications 
function, information flows and financial transactions.   This leads to questions about corporate legitimacy 
of banks (Cooper (1980, Meyer and Scott, 1983, DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) with a wide range of social, 
political and economic stakeholders.  Reform requires that the proposed regulatory changes be adopted to 
match the needs of the social context and hence improve legitimacy of the banking firm with a wide range 
of stakeholders (Cooper et al, 2007; Guthrie and Parker, 1990).This requires much more public and open 
debate about the nature of the bank financial communications function, how it changes over time, and how 
this can affect the quality of disclosure content to the MFI and the stock market, and other stakeholders.    
    Finally, the paper notes that climate change issues are providing a new stimulus to think about these 
issues. The financial communications function in banks and other financial firms has faced much 
questioning concerning suitability for producing and disclosing information on climate change issues. The 
Financial Standards Board (FSB) task force in climate related disclosure (2017) has recommended that 
firms disclose information on: Governance, Strategy, Risk Management, Metrics and Targets. This 
provides a new stimulus for the finance sector to look again at the learning, context formation, conduct and 
disclosure issues raised in this paper. It provides a new stimulus to think about the capabilities of 
‘dominant coalitions’ and organisation of financial communications in banks concerning climate change 
related disclosure.  These factors are likely to play a major role in the ‘Governance, Strategy, Risk 
Management, Metrics and Targets’ disclosure agenda. Regulators can use the ideas developed in this paper 
to consider how such factors contribute to the desired disclosure outcomes concerning climate change.   
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